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Abstract
Many studies have documented disparities in the regional responses to monetary policy
shocks. However, because of computational issues, the literature has often neglected the richest
level of disaggregation: the city. In this paper, we estimate the city-level responses to monetary
policy shocks in a Bayesian VAR. The Bayesian VAR allows us to model the entire panel of
metropolitan areas through the imposition of a shrinkage prior. We then seek the origin of
the city-level asymmetric responses. We nd strong evidence that population density and the
size of the local government sector mitigate the eects of monetary policy on local employment.
The roles of the traditional interest rate, equity, and credit channels are marginalized relative
to the previous ndings based on less-granular denitions of regions. However, the relevance of
the interest rate and credit channels appears to be more robust to business cycle uncertainty.
[JEL codes: C32, E32, E52]
Heidi Beyer-Powe and Kristie M. Engemann provided research assistance. We thank Keith Sill for a thorough
discussion; Adam Zaretsky for providing data; Patrick Brandt, Mark Fisher, Lutz Hendricks, Daniel Waggoner,
Tao Zha, seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Bank of Canada, Macro-Money seminar
at UNC-Chapel Hill, conference participants of the Society of Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 17th Annual
Symposium, the Western Economic Association International's 84th Annual Conference, and the Conference on
Empirical Macroeconomics using Geographical Data for feedback and suggestions. Tatevik Sekhposyan completed
part of this work as a Dissertation Intern at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, whose
hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein do not reect the ocial position of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Bank of Canada.
1\I believe that a successful theory of development (or of anything else) has to involve
more than aggregative modeling." - Lucas (1988)
1 Introduction
Intranational U.S. business cycle dynamics are not necessarily harmonious: A growing literature
has documented regional asymmetries in business cycles, the incidence of regional shocks, and
the dierential responses to aggregate shocks.1 This heterogeneity highlights the importance of
understanding the mechanism by which monetary policy propagates throughout various regions of
the U.S. economy. In this paper, we establish an empirical benchmark for regional asymmetries
in monetary policy transmission and examine why certain regions respond dierently to monetary
policy interventions.2
The empirical literature on geographically disaggregated eects of monetary policy uses struc-
tural VARs to identify the regional responses to innovations in the federal funds rate. Carlino and
DeFina (1998) show that certain Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions respond dierently
from the U.S. aggregate response to a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, while repeating the
exercise for state-level data, Carlino and DeFina (1999) nd substantial within- and cross-region
variability. Other papers [Mihov (2001), Hanson et al. (2006)] have shown that these regional
asymmetries exist at varying levels of disaggregation, for dierent datasets, and various identifying
restrictions governing the propagation of policy shocks.
In addition to documenting the presence of asymmetries, these studies consider their implica-
tions. In particular, they consider whether the notion of regional variation in response to monetary
shocks provides insight into the channels through which monetary policy aects the economy. In
other words, dierences in industry mix, banking concentration, rm size, or demographics can
1For example, Carlino and Sill (2001), Carlino and DeFina (2004), and Owyang et al. (2005) study regional
business cycles at dierent levels of disaggregation. Carlino and DeFina (1998) and others document dierences in
the regional response to monetary policy shocks. Canova and Pappa (2007) consider price dispersion across U.S.
states due to scal policy eects, while Beck et al. (2009) document the importance of aggregate and local shocks to
the ination dierentials across U.S. cities.
2There is a vast amount of literature debating the importance of monetary policy shocks for the business cycle
uctuations of the aggregate U.S. economy. Sims and Zha (2006) and Del Negro et al. (2007), among others, argue
that monetary policy shock plays a relatively little role and is not the most important factor driving the aggregate
U.S. business cycles. Carlino et al. (2001) reach the same conclusion for the disaggregate economy when analyzing the
importance of monetary policy shocks in the forecast error variance of employment growth for the ve metropolitan
areas they consider. In our work, we do not investigate the relative importance of aggregate monetary policy on our
disaggregated units. We, therefore, take the relative importance of aggregate monetary policy shocks as given and
investigate the monetary policy channels given the city-level data.
2aect a region's sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. Carlino and DeFina (1998), for exam-
ple, attribute most of the dierences in responses to the interest rate channel of monetary policy.
They also nd some evidence of a broad credit channel. Owyang and Wall (2009) show that the
industry mix { thus, the interest rate channel { is relevant for the depth of monetary recessions,
while the narrow credit channel prevails in determining the total cost of recessions. Fratantoni
and Schuh (2003) use a heterogeneous agent VAR to model the propagation from the aggregate
sector to the regional sector and highlight the importance of the housing markets.
While the stylized facts supporting the interest rate channel have been preserved, for the most
part, the literature has suggested there is considerable within-region variation when less-granular
denitions of regions are embraced (i.e., BEA regions). In this light, we focus on the nest unit of
geographic disaggregation: cities. Cities dene population areas with a high degree of economic
and social integration. In this regard counties, states, and countries are more arbitrary economic
units.
The economic growth literature has paid considerable attention to cities, as discussed in Glaeser
et al. (1995), among others. This choice has been motivated by a high degree of factor mobility
and specialization, externalities embodied in the spillover eects of physical and human capital,
and rich data capturing the heterogeneity in the political and social structure across cities, all of
which are important for growth.
The literature on urban economics also promotes cities as preferred economic units. For
example, by drawing concentric circles around U.S. cities, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) nd that
agglomeration economies attenuate with geographic distance. This points to heterogeneity in units
less aggregated than BEA regions and states. Also, Simon and Nardinelli (1996) nd evidence of
human capital concentration in cities and little evidence of knowledge spillovers across cities. This
indicates that a particular city can have a dierent human capital makeup than neighboring cities,
which implies that the ow of knowledge across geographic space is costly.
With an intention to gain from all the advantages of disaggregation, we focus on the city-level
properties of monetary policy induced recessions. Disaggregating to the city level provides the
benet of a larger panel across which we may measure regional asymmetries. In the rst stage
of this paper, we estimate a panel VAR to establish some facts about the regional transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, allowing for spillover eects across metropolitan areas. In the
second stage, we use a set of metro-area covariates to explain the dierences in the city-level
3economic responses to monetary policy shocks.
While increasing the panel size can sharpen our inference about the cause of variation across
cities, it also leads to potential parameter proliferation. The current literature's solution to this
problem is to impose restrictions on the propagation of shocks across cities (i.e., restrictions on the
lagged coecients of the VAR), the incidence of shocks (i.e., restrictions on the variance-covariance
matrix), or both. Our solution is to estimate a Bayesian VAR, which has been shown to forecast
out-of-sample fairly well [Doan et al. (1984), Litterman (1986)], even when the economic model is
large [Banbura et al. (2010)].
We nd considerable heterogeneity in how cities respond to monetary policy interventions. The
dierences are noticeable in the levels and persistence of the impulse responses, while cities appear
to be more alike with respect to the timing of recovery after economic downturns. Unlike the
previous literature, we nd marginal evidence that the interest rate, credit, and equity channels
help explain the dierences in city-level responses to monetary policy shocks. However, there is
strong evidence that population density and the size of the local government sector play prominent
roles. When considering the uncertainty surrounding the impulse responses, the strong role of the
local government sector disappears, while population density, interest rate, and equity channels are
marginally (and approximately equally) important.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the structural VAR used to estimate the
eects of monetary policy shocks. Section 3 introduces the data used in the estimation and the
reference prior and outlines the Gibbs sampler used to obtain the posterior distributions. Section
4 presents the empirical results; specically, we present some representative city-level impulse
responses that highlight the cross-sectional diversity in our sample. Section 5 attempts to explain
these dierences using city-level characteristics, such as industrial shares, banking concentrations,
and demographics among many others. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Model
We consider a structural VAR of the following form:
Gzt = C +
p X
l=1
Glzt l + t; 8t = 1;:::;T; (1)
4where zt and t are (m  1) vectors of time-t dependent variables and their time-t structural shocks,
respectively. The structural shocks are iid innovations, normally distributed with mean zero and
unit variance, t  N(0m;Im). The matrix G represents the contemporaneous eect of the
structural innovations on the vector of dependent variables.
Typically, the structural system (1) is not directly estimated. Instead, one estimates the
reduced-form VAR
zt = c +
p X
l=1
Blzt l + et; (2)
where et  N(0m;
) and the variance-covariance matrix 
 = (G0G)
 1. The standard methods
identify G from (2) by specifying a Wold causal chain structure, often by imposing an eect ordering
on the variables in the vector zt (e.g., interest rates respond to output and prices but not vice versa).
This system is, in general, estimated by a two-step procedure, where the reduced-form variance-
covariance matrix is estimated in the rst step, then the restricted contemporaneous matrix is
mapped from the variance-covariance matrix by a maximum likelihood procedure.
In contrast, the methodology we consider estimates the structural system (1) directly. This
allows us to accommodate partially identied, just identied, overidentied, as well as near-VAR
cases via linear restrictions on the contemporaneous and lagged coecients in a relatively simple
manner with a few advantages. As discussed in Sims and Zha (1999), the indirect estimation of
the contemporaneous eects in the VAR is valid when the restricted and unrestricted posterior
distributions for the reduced-form parameters have the same shape. This assumption, though
asymptotically satised, can be violated, for example, in overidentied cases in small samples.
Since this paper focuses on the local propagation of aggregate disturbances and, specically,
on monetary policy shocks, there is a need to model local-level variables in conjunction with the













where loct is the vector of n local- or regional-level variables and aggt is the vector of m   n
aggregate variables. D is a diagonal matrix and G21 and G22 are unrestricted partitions of G.
The identication of the system is achieved by restrictions in the spirit of Christiano et al. (1999)
5for the aggregate VAR and Carlino and DeFina (1998) for the regional system. Local shocks are
assumed to contemporaneously aect the region of origin only. Aggregate shocks aect regional
variables no sooner than with a one-period lag. Although the ordering of the aggregate variables
can vary depending on the case at hand, it is, in general, true that monetary policy responds to
unexpected movements in both regional and aggregate variables.3
3 Estimation
We take a Bayesian approach to the estimation of the model specied above, implementing the
Gibbs sampler for structural VARs as outlined in Waggoner and Zha (2003). In addition to im-
proving the small-sample properties of parameter estimates that are accommodated by the imposi-
tion of a prior, the Gibbs sampler naturally provides an appropriate characterization of parameter
distributions. Furthermore, a distribution for impulse responses is easily obtained.4
3.1 The Data
The benchmark model considers the dynamic behavior of
zt = [y1;t; :::; yi;t; :::; yn;t; Yt; pt; leadt; rt; nbrt; trt; m2t]0; (3)
where yi;t is the total non-farm employment for region i; Yt is (aggregate) GDP; pt is the core CPI
price level; and leadt is the Conference Board's composite index of 10 leading indicators. Leading
indicators capture macro-economic expectations in the empirical specications as in Sims (1992)
and Hanson (2004). The eective federal funds rate, rt, is the monetary instrument. We capture
the behavior of aggregate monetary variables by the dynamic paths of total non-borrowed reserves,
nbrt, total reserves, trt, and money supply, m2t. The series are observed at the quarterly frequency.
Except for the interest rate, all variables are seasonally adjusted and in logarithms (multiplied by
100). The latter standardizes the unit of measurement across the variables to percentage points.5
3For robustness we also consider the case where local shocks are correlated contemporaneously. This specication
results in a partially identied system. The results are fairly robust to the results of the benchmark scenario presented
further in the paper.
4Sims and Zha (1998) show that the 16th and 84th percentiles of the acquired distribution are well suited for
characterizing the shape of the posterior distribution of impulse responses compared with the alternative methods
that generate error bands. In addition, Monte Carlo studies considered in Kilian and Chang (2000) suggest that the
condence bands calculated this way are likely to be more accurate in high-dimensional VAR models.
5Total non-farm employment for metropolitan areas is taken from the Current Employment Statistics Survey
released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and covers the period of 1972:I-2004:IV. Core CPI is dened for all urban
6To achieve identication, we allow aggregate variables to respond contemporaneously to regional
innovations. For our purposes, a region is dened as a city (equivalently a metropolitan area)
meeting certain criteria detailed below. We impose the standard recursive VAR restrictions on the
aggregate block. As a result, even though the aggregate output, prices, and leading indicators are in
the contemporaneous feedback rule of the central banker, monetary policy has no contemporaneous
eect on any of these aggregate variables. These restrictions, together with the general restrictions
outlined previously, yield an overidentied system.
INSERT TABLE 1
The cities/metropolitan area units are selected to have at least 200,000 in total employment by
the end of 2004 and comparative data coverage for the sample period considered.6 The resulting
nal sample includes 105 cities/metropolitan areas listed in Table 1. It captures 63 percent of
aggregate total non-farm employment as of 2004:Q4. Some previous studies have used the BEA
regions to measure asymmetries within the U.S. economy. Our sample of cities/metropolitan areas
is representative of the cross-section of BEA regions: 6 percent of the metropolitan areas are from
the New England region, while 16 percent are from the Mideast, 18 percent are from the Great
Lakes, 6 percent are from the Plains, 27 percent are from the Southeast, 9 percent are from the
Southwest, 3 percent are from the Rocky Mountains, and 15 percent are from the Far West. These
numbers are broadly consistent with the populations of each region.
3.2 The Prior
The prior we use is proposed by Sims and Zha (1998) and discussed extensively in Robertson and
Tallman (1999). Let x0
t = [z0
t 1 ::: z0
t p 1], A = G0; and Fkm = [G1 ::: Gp C]0, where k = mp + 1.





consumers as the price level for all items less food and energy. Except for the index of leading indicators, the data are
obtained from the FRED database of the St. Louis Fed. The index of leading indicators comes from the Conference
Board.
6Metropolitan areas include Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(PMSAs) and are intended to dene population areas that have a high degree of economic and social integration.
The denitions of MSAs and PMSAs that we employ are based on the 1995 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 8-6. The metropolitan areas of Westchester County, NY, Camden, NJ, Philadelphia, PA, and Northern
Virginia, VA, are eliminated since they were counted as part of the New York, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey,
and Washington metropolitan areas, respectively. In 2004, the MSA and PMSA denitions have changed and the
old denitions have no longer been maintained, which explains the choice of our end-of-sample period.
7where ai and fi are the respective ith columns of A and F. It should be noted that our sample
size allows only for one lag in the VAR specication in equation (1).
INSERT TABLE 2
The prior on A imposes independence across the structural equations, where the elements of
ai are assumed to be jointly normal with mean zero. The prior mean of fijai is parameterized
such that it sets the conditional mean of the rst lag equal to ai and the rest to zero. The prior
postulates the following prior distributions:
ai  N(0;  Si);
fijai  N(  Piai;  Hi); (5)
for i = 1;:::;m. Given the setup of (4), the corresponding columns of A and F represent a
structural equation in the VAR. We impose priors on the order of integration and the possibility
of cointegration between the m variables by adding observations to the dataset as in Doan et al.
(1984) and Sims (1993). Values for the six hyperparameters are set as in Sims and Zha (1998) and
are shown in Table 2. The specics of the prior are discussed in the Appendix.
3.3 The Sampler
The Gibbs sampler is operationalized by dening bi and gi such that ai = Uibi and fi = Vigi, where
Ui and Vi are orthonormal rotation matrices that reduce the parameter space of the VAR, taking
into account the linear restrictions on the contemporaneous and lagged dynamics of the system.
The prior (5), together with the likelihood function, yield marginal posterior probability density
functions for bi and gi dened by












p(gijbi;X;Y ) = '(Pibi;Hi); (7)
where Hi, Pi, and Si are the appropriate transformations of the prior mean and variance matrices
 Hi,  Pi, and  Si.
The implied conditional posterior distribution of A is non-standard and independent of F.
The strategy implemented by Waggoner and Zha (2003) is to sample a set of normally dis-
8tributed coecients which, projected over a proper basis, generates the conditional distribution
p(bijb1 ::: bi 1 bi+1 ::: bm; X; Y ). The Gibbs sampler { outlined in Gelfand and Smith (1990),
Casella and George (1992), and Carter and Kohn (1994) { sequentially draws from the conditional






The rst 5,000 draws are discarded to eliminate the eect of the initial values. The results pre-
sented are based on the remaining 10,000 accumulated draws. Once the appropriate distribution
of A is at hand, obtaining a distribution for F via equation (7) is a straightforward task.7
4 Impulse Responses
We present the rst-stage empirical results in two parts. First, we elaborate on the behavior of the
aggregate block in our large Bayesian VAR. Next, we summarize the city-level impulse responses
to a monetary shock.
Figure 1 shows the responses of aggregate output, prices, index of leading indicators, non-
borrowed reserves, total reserves, and money supply to an approximate 33 basis point increase
in the eective federal funds rate. The results for the aggregate block are consistent with those
reported by Christiano et al. (1999). After the initial increase the eective federal funds rate
declines in a persistent manner, such that it is essentially zero around period 7. The contractionary
shock to the federal funds rate drives down output while there is evidence of a price puzzle with
a short-run increase in prices. Leading indicators decline and their recovery leads the recovery of
output. The liquidity eect drives non-borrowed reserves downward. The eect on total reserves
is overall insulated: Total reserves increase marginally upon impact and do not decline much in
later periods. The money supply declines and recovers at around period 7 when the federal funds
rate reaches zero.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Next, we present the city-level employment responses. Figure 2 shows the distributions of
modal impulse responses across the cities at various forecast horizons. In Period 4 the distribution
is fairly dispersed and mildly skewed to the left. There is a small proportion of cities for which
a contractionary monetary policy has a positive eect on employment. The skewness increases
7In order to assess the convergence of the algorithm, we have compared the reported benchmark results with those
obtained based on 20,000 accumulated draws; the results are similar.
9as the monetary policy induced business cycle reaches period 8, which roughly coincides with the
average trough period across the cities. Four years into the monetary policy induced recession
(period 16), the modal impulse response distribution becomes somewhat tighter, and the mode
of the distribution indicates that for most cities the eects of monetary policy are close to zero.
Figure 3 (panel a) shows that cities dier in both the magnitude of their employment responses at
the trough and in the timing of the trough. As for the latter, the trough for most cities occurs
between 7 and 9 quarters after the initial shock.
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3
In order to facilitate comparison of the impulse responses, we group the cities into clusters based
on similarities of their impulse responses over the 16-period business cycle horizon. While grouping
cities exogenously { say, by BEA region { might seem appropriate, we note that even cities in close
geographic proximity can exhibit very dierent responses to monetary policy, thus motivating the
necessity of an alternative grouping. More specically, we use the k-means algorithm to collect
the 105 city-level responses into 4 mutually exclusive groups.8
The composition of the clusters is presented in Table 3, while Table 4 highlights the average
behavior of the modal employment response for each of the clusters. The largest cluster, with
about a 44 percent membership rate, is Cluster 3. The behavior of the second-largest cluster,
Cluster 4, is qualitatively similar to the latter. The main dierence is in the overall magnitude
of the city-level employment response, which is on average twice as high for Cluster 4. The two
small clusters, Cluster 1 and Cluster 2, represent the extremes. The rst one is the cluster with
cities that are overall not very responsive to monetary policy, and when they respond, there is an
\employment puzzle" in that employment rst goes up and then contracts. Due to the puzzle,
the contraction occurs much later in the business cycle dynamics compared to the other clusters.
Cluster 2, on the other hand, has cities that are much more sensitive to the interest rate uctuations
compared to the rest.
Another feature obvious from Table 3 is that metropolitan areas from various BEA regions
belong to the same cluster, which implies that geographic distance is not as important factor as
gravity models would suggest. For example, Cluster 1, the smallest of all the clusters, includes
8The algorithm minimizes the total squared Euclidean distance of the metro areas in each cluster from the cluster
mean. At each iteration, the algorithm chooses the center for the clusters, reallocates the metropolitan areas, and
recalculates the center points until the algorithm converges. The exogenous number of clusters is chosen such that
it provides meaningful and qualitatively dierent groupings across the cities.
10cities from ve out of the eight BEA regions. Figure 3 (panel b) plots the cluster membership for
the modal response at the trough. It appears that our k-means clustering captures the magnitude
dierences in employment response at the trough fairly well.
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4
Next, we take a closer look at the results reported in Table 4. The second column reports
the maximum depth of the recession measured as the maximum employment contraction attained
during the recession; the level of contraction is averaged across the cities in respective clusters.
Cities in Cluster 1, for example, are not very sensitive to changes in the federal funds rate. On
average, cities in Cluster 2 appear to be the most sensitive to monetary shocks { the recession
trough results on average in a 0.16-percentage-point decline in employment. According to the
third column, the trough across the cities occurs on average between 8 and 12 quarters. The
total cost of the recession { measured by the total absolute deviation of employment from the
steady-state equilibrium and reported in column four { is on average higher for clusters with higher
average troughs.
The last three columns of Table 4 show the average behavior of the impulse responses across
the clusters at 4, 8, and 16 quarters after impact. Cities in Cluster 1 are expanding during the
initial quarters after the shock { these cities have the lowest trough response. Cluster 2 appears
to be the most sensitive to monetary policy shocks: At all horizons considered, the average decline
in employment for the cities in this cluster is considerably greater than that of other cities in other
clusters. The responses of employment in Clusters 3 and 4 are similar in shape but dierent
in magnitude. At any given period considered, the responses of Cluster 4 are about twice the
magnitude of the responses in Cluster 3. Consequently, Cluster 4 has roughly twice the total cost
of the Cluster 3 recession. However, there is no considerable dierence in the persistence of the
response: The timing for the trough roughly coincides for these two clusters. Thus, we could
conclude that most of the cities react to monetary policy contraction in a similar shape. The main
dierence is in the magnitudes of the responses. Cities do not dier much from each other in the
timing of a recession: When cities in one cluster start the recovery, the remaining clusters recover
within a year.
INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5
11Figure 4 shows the geographic location of the cities in various clusters. The gure highlights
that geographic proximity is not the only factor that determines how cities are clustered. For
example, the state of California includes cities from three out of four clusters we have identied.
Finally, we plot the employment response of a \representative" city from each cluster. We do so
by plotting the most frequent impulse responses (calculated based on the mode of the parameter
distributions) alongside the 68 percent coverage areas for the city closest to the cluster median
over the forecast horizons 1 to 16, jointly. The \representative city" in each cluster (Baton Rouge,
LA; Boise City, ID; Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; Albuquerque, NM) is depicted in Figure 5.9
Monetary policy shocks are shown to have transitory eects on employment for the representative
cities. Baton Rouge initially responds positively to the monetary policy contraction, slipping into a
recession between 6 and 12 quarters. Boise City represents the cluster most sensitive to monetary
policy. Albany-Schenectady-Troy and Albuquerque respond similarly with the response of the
latter being stronger.
5 Why Do Asymmetries Exist?
In the previous section, we documented the asymmetries across the metropolitan areas, in both the
depth and the duration of monetary policy induced recessions. In this section, we present results
of second-stage regressions, investigating whether certain city-level covariates may help explain the
variation in the cross-sectional impulse responses.
5.1 The Channels of Monetary Policy and the Economic Structure
Economic theory suggests a few potential causes for the asymmetric responses of real activity
to a monetary policy innovation: The distinctive economic and nancial structures of the local
economies, as well as the local-level policy, should factor into how regions respond. The discussion
relies on the hypothesis that certain features of the economy are, to a great extent, responsible
for the short-run or impact responses. We think of these features as indicators of a monetary
policy channel. Mishkin (1996), among others, has emphasized several channels for monetary
transmission: the interest rate, equity price, exchange rate, credit, and cost channels. Other
aspects of the economy predominantly aect the propagation mechanism, thus determining the
properties of the employment response in the longer run.
9The full sample of impulse responses is available upon request.
12In the interest rate channel hypothesis, an increase in the cost of borrowing triggers a decline
in investment spending, including business and residential xed investment and inventories. The
interest rate elasticity of each of these can vary at a local level because cities dier in their industry
mix, contractual agreements governing the housing market, and institutional details that aect
interest rate sensitivity. For example, industries such as construction and manufacturing are
presumed to be more sensitive to interest rate uctuations because they rely more heavily on
borrowing and inventories. Thus, in cities where these industries are dominant, one would expect
greater reactions to changes in real interest rates. Although the traditional interest rate channel
appears to be less important on the aggregate level [see Chirinko (1993) and Mishkin (1996)],
several studies have shown that industry composition is signicant in explaining the asymmetric
responses of real activity to monetary policy shocks across regions [Carlino and DeFina (1998);
Carlino and DeFina (1999); and Owyang and Wall (2009)].
The equity channel of monetary policy works through a wealth eect spurred by a decrease in
interest rates. The types of equities that have the potential to create heterogeneous eects locally
via this channel are housing and land, since housing and land markets are substantially aected by
local supply and demand conditions [Lamont and Stein (1999), Abraham and Hendershott (1992)],
while other equity markets are fairly centralized and homogeneous. Dierences in neighborhood
amenities, such as the quality of schools and the kinds of local businesses, are some of the myriad of
factors that determine local valuations of housing and land. For example, residents in a high-priced
neighborhood may be willing to absorb the brunt of unfavorable economic shocks in order to keep
their housing values high, whereas residents in lower-priced areas may have dierent motives.
The local transmission of monetary policy may also be aected by international trade and the
exchange rate. Regional asymmetries can arise if there are dierences in the proportion of traded
and non-traded sectors at the city level. Because manufacturing and mining are largely traded
industries, while construction and services are largely non-traded, a city having a greater proportion
of manufacturing rms would be more sensitive to innovations to monetary policy via this channel.
Dierences in the nancial structure of cities are important for the credit channel of monetary
policy. Under the narrow credit channel (or bank lending channel) hypothesis, a contractionary
monetary policy decreases bank reserves and deposits and, therefore, also the amount of funds avail-
able for lending [Kashyap and Stein (1994)], which curtails investment and real economic activity.
If banks rely heavily on deposit liabilities and borrowers are unable to tap alternative sources of
13funding, having more small banks and small rms translates into greater regional sensitivity to
monetary policy.10
On the other hand, the broad credit channel hypothesis emphasizes general credit market im-
perfections and is not limited to bank lending [Bernanke et al. (1999)]. The broad credit channel
assumes that a wedge between external and internal nancing is induced by agency costs. During
monetary contractions, rms' cash ows, net worth, and collateral values decline, increasing the
agency costs associated with distinguishing \high-quality" rms. As external nancing becomes
more expensive, investments and real activity decline. Therefore, cities with less-established rms
and industries and/or less-capitalized entities { features associated with high agency costs { will
be greatly aected by monetary policy via this channel.
Under the cost channel of monetary policy, interest rate movements result in supply-side eects {
output contracts and prices increase with an increase in the real interest rate. Whenever a rigidity
causes marginal cost to depend on interest rates [Barth, III and Ramey (2002) and Christiano
et al. (1997)]. For example, when factors of production are paid before sales revenues are received
and rms have to borrow to nance working capital, increases in interest rates may have severe
consequences for these rms. Thus, monetary policy may have larger eects in manufacturing-
dominated cities.
The monetary policy transmission channels discussed up to this point are the main sources of
monetary business cycles identied by the literature. Nevertheless, the general socio-economic
structure of cities has the potential to create asymmetric propagation eects. For example, if a
city is more industrially diverse, it should be able to absorb the eects of economic shocks more
easily. A similar argument also applies to a diverse labor force: A more educated labor force can
more easily shift across dierent sectors, thus reducing the eects of monetary shocks on city-level
employment. The overall exibility of the labor markets matters as well. If a greater proportion
of the labor force is unionized, then the adjustment process for employment is less accentuated
because rms nd it harder to re workers. Access to nancial markets invariably depends on an
individual's net worth. One source of net worth is an individual's income. Therefore, cities having
residents with relatively high incomes should be more sensitive to monetary policy. On the other
10The empirical evidence in support of the narrow credit channel has been mixed. Studies conducted at the rm
level [Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996a,b)] nd no substantive evidence supporting
the bank lending channel for small versus large rms because the ratio of bank credit to nonbank credit does not
change substantially over the business cycle depending on a rm type. However, small rms do appear to exhibit
more interest rate sensitivity compared to the large ones.
14end of the spectrum, the poverty level not only provides a way to measure the proportion of the
population that tends not to participate in nancial markets, but also signals the degree to which
resources are allocated to welfare programs. Such welfare programs typically divert resources from
productive uses. Finally, high crime rates tend to discourage entrepreneurship. Residents in
high-crime neighborhoods may refuse to take advantage of favorable interest rates even if protable
investment opportunities are available. Also, higher crime rates usually exist in an environment
in which more resources are allocated away from production and into law enforcement. These
additional factors, though demographic in nature, can cause monetary policy to have dierential
eects on cities.
Local-level scal policy could also have propagation eects on monetary policy. The higher the
share of government employment, the more acyclical the local business cycle can be. This argument
indeed can be reconciled with the thinking that the government sector is slow to adjust or that it
might not have the incentive to adjust quickly in order to absorb some of the adverse eects of the
business cycle. On the expenditure side, the type and magnitude of local government spending
could potentially crowd out federal-level policies. Cities having sizable expenditure outlays may
nd their local residents saving more to meet expected future tax burdens. Thus, expansionary
(wealth-increasing) monetary policy may prove futile if local residents exhibit such Ricardian-type
behavior. Additionally, the degree of the local tax burden determines the number of businesses
that operate in a certain locale, which inuences the extent to which policy is propagated locally.
5.2 Testing the Transmission Hypothesis
To identify which channels are important for determining the local eects of monetary policy
shocks, we assess how well certain city-level characteristics explain the variation in the impulse
responses. We should note that at times, an exact identication between monetary policy channels
and various propagation mechanisms is impossible since some of the covariates can be relevant under
many dierent channels. Specically, we consider a cross-sectional regression of the following form:
ir =  + X + ; (8)
where ir is an n  1 vector that describes a certain property of the impulse response for the local
variables. The n  k vector X represents k covariates for each city n;  is the residual and is
assumed to be N(0n;h 1In).
15As the discussion of the asymmetric responses suggests, a large number of covariates can be
correlated with the increased sensitivity of local employment to monetary policy innovations. In
addition, it is dicult to assess a priori which of the covariates are more important. Therefore,
we consider k (in our case k = 24) covariates and allow any subset of k covariates to constitute a
model. By doing so we have 2k (224 = 16;777;216) alternative models to choose from. To evaluate
which model (set of covariates) best explains the asymmetric monetary policy eects, we rely on the
Bayesian Model Averaging technique. In particular, we implement the Bayesian Model Averaging
via the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition (MC3) algorithm initially developed in
Madigan et al. (1995) and discussed in detail in Koop (2003).
We consider a sequence of models Mr; r = 1;2; ::: R (R = 2k). To estimate a linear regression
model r, we use a standard set of priors. The parameters common to all of the models take
noninformative priors, i.e., p(h) / 1
h and p() / 1.11 We assume a standard, conjugate Normal-
Gamma prior for the 's centered around zero, which emphasizes our prior hypothesis that the
covariates are not related to monetary policy eects. More specically,
rjh / N(0r; h 1[grX0
rXr] 1); (9)
where gr is a hyperparameter set to 1=maxfn;k2g.12
The prior, together with the likelihood function, implies a multivariate-t distribution for the

















where  ir =
Pn
j=1 irj
n and PXr = In   Xr(X0
rXr) 1X0
r. Since ultimately we are interested in model
choice/averaging, the quantity in concern is the probability of various models given the data,
p(Mrjir) / p(irjMr)p(Mr), where p(Mr) is the prior probability assigned to the model r.
The essence of the MC3 algorithm is to simulate from the model space by taking more model
draws from the regions where the model probabilities are high and fewer model draws from the
11Given the prior, to ensure that the intercept has identical interpretation for every model, we demean the regressors.
12The prior and its convenient properties are thoroughly discussed in Fern andez et al. (2001). In essence, this prior
allows for analytic marginal likelihood calculations while leading to satisfactory results from the predictive point of
view.
16regions where the model probabilities are low. In particular, starting from a model M0, the MC3
draws a sequence of models Ms; s = 1; :::;S, where Ms is a particular realization of Mr; r =
1; :::;R. More specically, the MC3 algorithm is implemented as follows:
1. Start with a model M0 (to initialize we run an ordinary least squares regression of the
dependent variable on the set of all covariates and include the covariates with t-statistics
> 0:5).
2. Generate a candidate model draw (M) and choose with an equal probability from the current
model Ms 1, all models that delete one covariate, and all models that add one explanatory
variable (the constant is always included).








which simplies when we assume equal prior probabilities for each model, p(M) = p(Ms 1).
Given the S = S0 + S1 draws, we truncate the rst S0 = 10;000 draws and calculate the
posterior inclusion probabilities and coecient estimates based on remaining S1 = 100;000 ac-
cumulated draws. The coecient estimates are conditional on covariates being included in the
model specication; the marginal posterior distribution of slope parameters becomes a mixture of
t-distributions implied by each model that includes the specic set of regressors. Hence, the mean














The covariate set that we use to account for the variability in the employment response across
the cities is broadly divided into six categories: demographic and general socio-economic, industry
mix, housing, banking, industrial organization, and scal variables. The original series and their
sources are provided in Table 5.
17INSERT TABLE 5
The covariates in the demographic and socio-economic category capture the general city-size
eects, human capital endowment, and various measures of income distribution across cities. We
use the total number of people and households to get proportional measures for poverty, households
with no wage or salary income, and households with no interest, dividend, or net rental income.
Per capita crime numbers are calculated as a ratio of total crimes to the population.13 Industry
mix is calculated as a share of total employment in a specic industry and by construction sums to
1. For certain metropolitan areas, construction and mining indicators are constructed as the sum of
construction and mining series available separately. In the estimation, we leave out the construction
and mining to avoid singularity. The data in the housing category control for the overall level of
housing prices, as well as the proportion of owner-occupied housing. Banking indicators include
covariates to proxy for the number of small rms and large banks that, as discussed previously,
are thought to be important under the credit channel of monetary policy. The covariates under
the industrial organization category (i.e., average establishment size, industrial diversity index, and
union membership) measure the overall exibility of the economy. The scal variables measure the
eect of local government activity on heterogeneity upon the monetary policy response. In order
to get per capita measures for the scal variables, we adjust the nominal revenue and expenditure
gures by the midpoint of recorded population in the respective metropolitan areas between 1980
and 1986 and between 1990 and 2000. The list of all of the covariates, their relevance under
various channels of monetary policy, and their potential to create asymmetric propagation eects
are provided in Table 6. Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics on the covariates.
INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7
It should be noted that although our choice of covariates is motivated by economic theory, it is
constrained by availability of data. Since for most of the series comparable data coverage is not
available, we target the year 1990 for our covariate series: It is about the middle of our sample
period and the 1990 Census data make the covariate set richer. For series that do not have 1990
data readily available, we construct an approximation by taking averages for the years for which
data are available (see Table 5).
13Given the availability of comparable data that came from the same source, we calculate the per capita crime
measures using 1985 (1999) values of total serious crimes known to police and 1986 (2000) population gures.
185.4 Empirical Results for Modal Impulse Responses
Tables 8 and 9 present our second-stage regression results when we consider the modal impulse
responses across the cities as a dependent variable. We test the transmission mechanisms of
monetary policy using certain features of the modal impulse responses: the maximum (negative)
response, the total cost of a recession expressed as the area under the impulse response, or the
values of the impulse responses at select horizons. For each covariate we highlight its inclusion
probability. The constant has an inclusion probability of 1 by construction. In addition, we
present the posterior mean [see (12)] and the posterior standard deviation [calculated as the square
root of (13)] of the slope coecients. The latter can be used to approximate the 68 percent (or 95
percent) coverage areas of the posterior distributions and whether or not either area supports the
hypothesis of the slope coecient being statistically dierent from zero.
INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9
Table 8 presents the results using the maximum employment contraction and the total cost of
monetary policy induced business cycles as left-hand-side variables. Two of the covariates con-
sidered perform particularly well in this exercise in that they are included in at least 90 percent
of the models that attempt to explain the dierences in monetary policy responses across cities.
Under the specication with the maximum contraction, population density has almost 100 percent
inclusion probability, while government employment is included in 90 percent of the models. Ad-
ditionally, the posterior distribution of the slope coecients indicates that the 95 percent coverage
areas exclude zero in both cases. Similar results hold when we use the total cost of the business
cycle as a regressand, except, in this case, the inclusion probability for government employment
drops from 90 percent to 76 percent.
In Table 9, we present the results for values of the impulse responses at select horizons. We
use the levels of output contraction at 4, 8, and 16 periods after the initial shock as left-hand-side
variables for regression (8). Consistent with the previous results, population density is included
in almost all of the models for each of the response periods. The results also indicate that the
fraction of population with no wage/salary income and the fraction of owner-occupied housing
are relatively important a year or so after the initial shock. Government sector employment is
important in the short to medium run (at least up to 2 years after the shock). Establishment
size and housing price index (HPI) are important in the long run (up to 4 years after the shock).
19Manufacturing, an interest rate sensitive industry, is important in the short to medium run with
inclusion probabilities of 29 and 25 percent, respectively. The standard errors of the covariates with
high inclusion probabilities are relatively small, which implies concentrated posterior distributions
with 95 percent coverage areas that exclude zero.
In general, all covariates that have high inclusion probabilities behave according to expectation.
Manufacturing and home-ownership amplify the eects of the interest rate increase. The latter
could be due to wealth eects. Housing prices, government employment, establishment size, and
population density, on the other hand, mitigate the eects of the contractionary monetary policy.
5.5 Empirical Results for the Distribution of Impulse Responses
In order to account for the uncertainty around the impulse responses, we conduct our model
selection exercise based on a distribution (as opposed to the mode) of our parameter estimates.
More specically, we take every 100th draw from the simulated posterior distribution of the VAR
parameters, generate an impulse response corresponding to the selected draw, then conduct the
model selection exercise for that particular response. The results are in Tables 10 and 11.
INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11
The inclusion probabilities for the covariates tend to decline. This is expected given that we
now account for the uncertainties associated with the VAR coecients and these uncertainties are
not small. Overall, population density is still an important covariate. Interestingly, the role of
government employment declines signicantly when we consider the trough response, as well as the
total cost of the business cycles. However, this covariate still appears to be relatively important
for the short- to medium-term responses (periods 4 and 8). The roles of manufacturing and home-
ownership are greater for the trough response and the total cost of the recession when compared
to the results obtained based on modal impulse responses. In addition, the relative importance of
the unionization rate for the overall recession costs also increases.
In summary, when we look at the inclusion probabilities of the covariates when explaining the
cross-sectional variability of a distribution of impulse responses, we nd that population density
still continues to be the relatively more important covariate. We nd that manufacturing and
home-ownership rates are also as important in this case as they were when explaining the cross-
sectional variation in the modal impulse response. Furthermore, their role has become increasingly
20important, which is reected in the increased inclusion probabilities, most notably for period 16.
Towards the end of the monetary policy induced recession, the inclusion probabilities for manufac-
turing increases from 0.05 to 0.15; for home-ownership rates it increases from 0.05 to 0.17.
5.6 Relation to the Existing Literature
Carlino and DeFina (1998), Owyang and Wall (2009), and Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) found
signicant roles for the interest rate, credit, and equity channels. In our case, the inclusion
probabilities for the variables proxying the interest rate and equity channels (namely, share of
manufacturing, home-ownership rates, house prices) are smaller compared to the inclusion proba-
bilities of variables that proxy the overall propagation eects (such as population density and share
of government employment). Population density appears to be the most important covariate in
explaining the cross-sectional variation. However, the results about the importance of manufac-
turing and home-ownership rates appear to be the most robust: They hold for both the modal
responses, as well as for a distribution of impulse responses.
The framework we chose to analyze monetary policy channels with the city-level data is more
general than that considered in the literature and comes with certain intricacies. First, accounting
for model uncertainty using Bayesian Model Averaging may make the importance of the major
channels responsible for the variations in the local eects of monetary policy diminish compared
to results obtained with only a subset of potentially important covariates. Second, the regional
covariation modeled in studies that examine larger geographic regions than cities may be too coarse.
Third, the employment across the metropolitan area sample examined here does not sum to the
national employment. Because we included only the larger cities, any propagation that occurs in
smaller cities or rural areas is essentially excluded. If, for example, factories are located away from
more densely populated areas, some standard monetary channels (e.g., the interest rate channel)
may be de-emphasized in this analysis. Finally, it may be that no single channel is eective for all
of the cities within the sample.
6 Conclusion
The previous literature testing variations in the regional responses to monetary policy shocks has
revealed that industry share, among other factors, plays an important role. To avoid parameter
proliferation in the VAR, these studies have considered the dierences between the eects in large
21regions (e.g., BEA regions) or have placed substantial restrictions on cross-regional (especially
cross-state) comovements. The economic growth and urban literature, on the other hand, has long
recognized that cities may be a better unit of analysis than BEA regions or even states. Cross-
city variation in industrial mix exists, even within states, potentially confounding the researcher's
ability to truly identify regional variation. Moreover, agglomeration and other eects (e.g., local
housing markets) can be observed only at the city level.
Using a large Bayesian VAR with city-level data, we nd signicant and important cross-metro-
area variation in the response of employment to a monetary policy shock. This variation extends
to cities even in close geographic proximity or even within the same state. In testing the channels
through which monetary policy aects employment, we nd { at the city level { propagation eects
to be more important in explaining the cross-sectional variation of the \most common" recessions
across the cities. The more traditional channels of monetary policy, such as the interest rate
channel (measured with the manufacturing share) or the equity channel (measured with the house
prices and home-ownership rates), appear to be less important in explaining the business cycle
variations across the cities. However, the results in regard to these covariates appear to be robust
to the uncertainty around the impulse responses.
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26Appendix: The Reference Prior
The standard deviation for all elements in the jth row of  Si is dened by 0
j . In each equation i;
the standard deviation of a coecient on lag p for variable j is determined by  Hi = 01
jp3 . The
prior standard deviation for the constant is 04. For example, let's consider the case of p = 1 as
it is in our empirical specication. For simplicity, suppose m = 2. It follows from the discussion
above that for i = 1;2,



















where diag(v) represents a matrix with elements of v on the main diagonal and zeros everywhere
else. The role of the hyperparameters is presented in Table 2. A scaling factor, j, is included
to mitigate the unit of measure eect across the variables. In practice, j is approximated by the
sample standard deviation of the residuals that result from a univariate autoregression of order p
for each series j.
The initial observations are added as follows. In order to impose beliefs on the order of
integration, we add m observations to the dataset indexed by t = 1;:::;m, such that for j =











5 z0j j = t;s  k   1
0 otherwise
;
where  z0j is the average of the rst p observations for each series j.
In order to adjust the prior to allow for cointegration, the data matrix is augmented with a
single new observation. This initial observation is constructed such that for j = 1;:::;m and





6 z0j s  k   1
6 s = k
:
27Table 1: Description of Metropolitan Areas (MAs)
Label Metropolitan Area Label Metropolitan Area
ABQ Albuquerque, NM LEX Lexington, KY
AKR Akron, OH LOI Louisville, KY-IN
ALB Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY LRS Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR
ALL Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA LSV Las Vegas, NV-AZ
ANA Ann Arbor, MI MDS Madison, WI
ANH Orange County, CA MIA Miami, FL
APP Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MOB Mobile, AL
ATL Atlanta, GA MPH Memphis, TN-AR-MS
AUG Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI
AUS Austin-San Marcos, TX MWK Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI
BAK Bakerseld, CA NFK Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC
BIR Birmingham, AL NHV New Haven-Meriden, CT
BOI Boise City, ID NOR New Orleans, LA
BOS Boston, MA-NH NSS Nassau-Suolk, NY
BTM Baltimore, MD NVL Nashville, TN
BTR Baton Rouge, LA NWK Newark, NJ
BUF Bualo-Niagara Falls, NY NYP New York, NY
CBA Columbia, SC OAK Oakland, CA
CGR Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC OKC Oklahoma City, OK
CHI Chicago, IL OMA Omaha, NE-IA
CHT Chattanooga, TN-GA ORL Orlando, FL
COL Columbus, OH PHP Philadelphia, PA-NJ
CRL Charleston-North Charleston, SC PHX Phoenix-Mesa, AZ
CTI Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PIT Pittsburgh, PA
CVL Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH POR Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA
DAL Dallas, TX PRI Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA
DEM Des Moines, IA RAD Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
DEN Denver, CO RCP Richmond-Petersburg, VA
DET Detroit, MI REN Reno, NV
DYS Dayton-Springeld, OH ROH Rochester, NY
ELP El Paso, TX RSB Riverside-San Bernardino, CA
FRE Fresno, CA SAC Sacramento, CA
FTL Ft. Lauderdale, FL SAT San Antonio, TX
FWA Fort Wayne, IN SDI San Diego, CA
GNS Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC SFR San Francisco, CA
GNV Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC SJO San Jose, CA
GRR Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI SLC Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT
GRY Gary, IN SPD Springeld, MA
HAR Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA STL St Louis, MO-IL
HON Honolulu, HI STO Stockton-Lodi, CA
HST Houston, TX SYR Syracuse, NY
HTF Hartford, CT TMA Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
IND Indianapolis, IN TOL Toledo, OH
JAS Jackson, MS TRT Trenton, NJ
JAX Jacksonville, FL TUC Tucson, AZ
JYC Jersey City, NJ TUL Tulsa, OK
KAL Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI VEN Ventura, CA
KNC Kansas City, MO-KS WIC Wichita, KS
KNX Knoxville, TN WIL Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD
LAC Lancaster, PA WOR Worcester, MA-CT
LAN Lansing-East Lansing, MI WPB West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL
LAX LA-Long Beach, CA WSH Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV
YNG Youngstown-Warren, OH
28Table 2: Sims-Zha Reference Prior
Hyperparameter Value Interpretation
0 1 Controls the overall tightness of the beliefs
1 0.2 Tightens the prior around a random walk
3 1 Directs the rate at which the prior contracts with an increase in lag length
4 1 Controls the tightness of the constant
5 1 Governs the prior on the order of integration
6 1 Sets the prior belief on the presence of cointegration
29Table 3: Clustering the Metropolitan Areas
MA BEA Region MA BEA Region MA BEA region
Cluster 1 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
BTR SE ALB ME ABQ SW
DAL SW ALL ME AKR GL
HST SW AUS SW ANA GL
LAN GL BAK FW ANH FW
NFK SE BOS NE APP GL
NYP ME BTM ME ATL SE
OKC SW BUF ME AUG SE
RCP SE CBA SE BIR SE
SFR FW CHI GL CGR SE
TUL SW CRL SE CHT SE
DEM PL COL GL
DET GL CTI GL
Cluster 2 DYS GL CVL GL
BOI RM ELP SW DEN RM
FTL SE HON FW FRE FW
GRR GL JAX SE FWA GL
KAL GL JYC ME GNS SE
LSV SW KNC PL GNV SE
POR FW LAC ME GRY GL
PRI NE LAX FW HAR ME
TUC SW LEX SE HTF NE
LRS SE IND GL
MDS GL JAS PL
MIA SE KNX SE
MPH SE LOI SE
NHV NE MOB SE
NSS ME MSP PL
NVL SE MWK GL
NWK ME NOR SE
OAK FW ORL SE
OMA PL PHX SW
PHP ME PIT ME
ROH ME RAD SE
SAC FW REN FW
SAT SW RSB FW
SLC RK SDI FW
SPD NE SJO FW
STL PL TMA SE
STO FW TOL GL
SYR ME VEN FW






Notes: NE, ME, GL, PL, SE, SW, RM, and FW stand for New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountain,
and Far West regions, respectively. Details are at www.bea.gov/regional/docs/regions.cfm. Metropolitan areas are abbreviated as in Table 1.
30Table 4: Properties of the Metropolitan Area Clusters
Depth Employment Response
Max Period Total Period 4 Period 8 Period 16
Cluster 1 -0.03 11.60 0.41 0.03 -0.01 -0.02
Cluster 2 -0.16 9.13 1.79 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09
Cluster 3 -0.04 8.26 0.37 -0.02 -0.04 0.00
Cluster 4 -0.08 8.12 0.83 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02
Notes: The values in the table are averages across the cities in a respective cluster. \Max" refers to the depth of
the recession measured by the maximum employment contraction attained during the recession. \Period"
documents the period when the maximum contraction is attained. \Total" refers to the total cost of the recession
measured as a total absolute deviation of employment from the steady-state equilibrium. \Period 4," \Period 8,"
and \Period 16" measure the employment response at the specied horizon.
31Table 5: Metropolitan Area Covariate Data Sources
Description Freq Period S
Demographic & General Socio-Economic
Total Resident Population (Thous.) A 1990 H2
Persons Per Square Mile A 1990 O
Persons 18 years and over: with at least an Associate degree A 1990 S
Households: Median household income A 1989 S
Persons for whom poverty status is determined A 1989 S
Households: No wage or salary income A 1989 S
Households: No interest, dividend, or net rental income A 1989 S
Serious Crimes Known To Police, Total A 1985, 1999 D
Industry Mix - Total Employment by Industry Sector (Thous.)
Construction M 1990 H1
Mining M 1990 H1
Construction and Mining M 1990 H1
Trade M 1990 H1
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate M 1990 H1
Government M 1990 H1
Manufacturing M 1990 H1
Services M 1990 H1
Transportation, Communications, Electric, M 1990 H1
Gas, & Sanitary Services
Housing
Housing Price Index (HPI) Q 1990 F
Housing: Percent Owner-Occupied A 1980, 2000 D
Banking
Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) A 1990 B
Banking Market Deposits A 1990 B
Loans to Businesses with Gross Annual Revenues 1 Million (Thous.) A 1996 C
Industrial Organization
Average Establishment Size A 1990 O
\Dixit-Stiglitz" Index of Industrial Diversity A 1990 O
Total Labor Union Membership (%) A 1990 U
Fiscal Variables
City Government General Revenue: Total A 1984-85,1996-97 D
City Government General Expenditures: Total A 1984-85,1996-97 D
Notes: Sources are abbreviated as follows: B - Federal Reserve Board of Governors; C - CRA (Community
Reinvestment Act) MSA Aggregate Report; D - County and City Data Book, 1988 Edition and 2000 Edition; F -
Federal Housing Finance Agency; H1 - Haver's LABORR database (vintage 02/21/2003; the Bureau of Labor
Statistics was the original source); H2 - Haver's USPOP database (vintage 2/18/2005; the Census Bureau was the
original source); O - Owyang et al. (2008); S - Census 1990 Summary File 3; U - Union Membership and Coverage
Database (www.unionstats.com). \A", \M", and \Q" indicate annual, monthly, and quarterly frequencies,
respectively.
32Table 6: Covariates and Channels of Monetary Policy
Covariate Interest Equity Exchange Narrow Broad Propagation
Rate Rate Credit Credit









Fract. of Pop. Below Poverty
p p
Fract. of HH: No Wage/Salary
p p
Fract. of HH: No Interest/Dividend
p p
Serious Crimes Known to Police
p
Industry Mix




































Notes: The table lists the covariates, their relevance under various channels of monetary policy, and their potential
to create asymmetric propagation eects. HH, HHI, and HPI stand for Households, Herndahl-Hirschman Index,
and Housing Price Index, respectively.
33Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Covariates
Covariate Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Demographic & General Socio-Economic
Population 6.92 0.76 5.55 9.09
Population Density 6.61 1.04 3.69 10.19
Fract. of Pop. with College Degree 0.27 0.06 0.11 0.47
Median Household Income 10.33 0.17 9.87 10.85
Fract. of Pop. Below Poverty 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.29
Fract. of HH: No Wage/Salary 0.21 0.04 0.13 0.34
Fract. of HH: No Interest/Dividend 0.59 0.08 0.36 0.83
Serious Crimes Known to Police 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.14
Industry Mix
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.14
Government 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.32
Manufacturing 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.33
Services 0.26 0.04 0.18 0.46
Transport, Communications, etc. 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.13
Trade 0.24 0.02 0.16 0.29
Housing
HPI 0.92 0.12 0.66 1.25
Fract. of Owner-Occupied Housing 0.54 0.12 0.22 1.13
Banking
HHI 7.26 0.46 6.05 8.06
Banking Market Deposits 14.90 1.36 12.84 19.22
Small Business Loans 12.43 0.71 10.24 14.23
Industrial Organization
Establishment Size 1.35 0.12 1.03 1.57
Industrial Diversity Index 5.52 0.19 5.06 5.92
Union Membership 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.39
Fiscal Variables
Government Revenue 6.97 0.54 5.29 8.78
Government Expenditures 6.97 0.50 6.03 8.71
Notes: The table lists the descriptive statistics for the covariates after the respective transformations. HH, HHI,
and HPI stand for Households, Herndahl-Hirschman Index, and Housing Price Index, respectively.
34Table 8: Testing the Transmission Hypothesis Based on Modal Response
Covariate Maximum Response Total Cost of Business Cycle
P( 6= 0jy) ^  std() P( 6= 0jy)   ^ std()
Constant 1.0000 -0.0648 0.0033 1.0000 0.6607 0.0365
Population 0.0546 0.0000 0.0003 0.0491 0.0017 0.0034
Population Density 0.9964 0.0169 0.0035 0.9936 -0.1782 0.0382
Fract. of Pop. with College Degree 0.0420 -0.0008 0.0026 0.0447 -0.0093 0.0303
Median Household Income 0.0566 0.0010 0.0013 0.0606 -0.0143 0.0154
Fract. of Pop. Below Poverty 0.0388 -0.0009 0.0032 0.0549 0.0176 0.0492
Fract. of HH: No Wage/Salary 0.0635 -0.0042 0.0052 0.0666 0.0680 0.0599
Fract. of HH: No Interest/Dividend 0.0370 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0409 0.0071 0.0207
Serious Crimes Known to Police 0.0661 -0.0101 0.0095 0.0468 0.0379 0.0743
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 0.1478 0.0441 0.0271 0.1014 -0.3266 0.2059
Government 0.8961 0.2476 0.0614 0.7557 -1.7863 0.5679
Manufacturing 0.2097 -0.0330 0.0125 0.1655 0.2453 0.1074
Services 0.0992 -0.0134 0.0091 0.0890 0.1521 0.0887
Transport, Communications, etc. 0.0913 0.0232 0.0189 0.0849 -0.2495 0.1944
Trade 0.0628 0.0017 0.0107 0.0484 0.0177 0.0908
HPI 0.1330 0.0064 0.0038 0.1775 -0.1080 0.0569
Fract. of Owner-Occupied Housing 0.0821 -0.0029 0.0024 0.0579 0.0183 0.0187
HHI 0.0630 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0628 0.0044 0.0052
Banking Market Deposits 0.0546 0.0001 0.0001 0.0413 -0.0003 0.0012
Small Business Loans 0.1617 -0.0016 0.0009 0.1300 0.0134 0.0080
Establishment Size 0.0764 0.0028 0.0024 0.0829 -0.0393 0.0281
Industrial Diversity Index 0.0447 -0.0004 0.0010 0.0483 0.0013 0.0120
Union Membership 0.0503 0.0010 0.0022 0.0476 -0.0122 0.0231
Government Revenue 0.0424 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0428 -0.0010 0.0034
Government Expenditures 0.0509 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0414 0.0019 0.0037
Notes: The table represents the Bayesian Model Averaging results for the regression in (8). The rst column
represents the covariate set considered, i.e., the set of potential x variables. The columns under \Maximum
Response" and \Total Cost of Business Cycle" depict the inclusion probabilities [P( 6= 0jir)], the posterior means
[calculated by (12)], and the posterior standard deviation [calculated as a square root of (13)] when the regressand
is the respectively titled property of the modal impulse response. HH, HHI, and HPI stand for Households,






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 10: Testing the Transmission Hypothesis Based on a Distribution of Responses
Covariate Maximum Response Total Cost of Business Cycle
P( 6= 0jy) ^  std() P( 6= 0jy)   ^ std()
Constant 1.0000 -0.1553 0.0154 1.0000 1.4090 0.1076
Population 0.0719 0.0012 0.0016 0.0845 -0.0192 0.0143
Population Density 0.2142 0.0071 0.0030 0.2297 -0.0544 0.0232
Fract. of Pop. with College Degree 0.0607 -0.0034 0.0168 0.0583 0.0277 0.1142
Median Household Income 0.0678 0.0029 0.0069 0.0588 -0.0225 0.0456
Fract. of Pop. Below Poverty 0.0673 0.0102 0.0240 0.0718 -0.1709 0.1807
Fract. of HH: No Wage/Salary 0.0646 0.0063 0.0250 0.0665 -0.0799 0.1728
Fract. of HH: No Interest/Dividend 0.0542 -0.0028 0.0114 0.0579 0.0442 0.0868
Serious Crimes Known to Police 0.1185 -0.1508 0.0813 0.1441 1.5127 0.7229
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 0.1020 0.0384 0.0752 0.0825 -0.1305 0.4410
Government 0.1021 0.0513 0.0340 0.1119 -0.4007 0.2570
Manufacturing 0.2261 -0.1363 0.0556 0.3489 1.6315 0.5936
Services 0.0759 0.0069 0.0298 0.0899 -0.2308 0.2333
Transport, Communications, etc. 0.0921 0.1380 0.0912 0.1156 -1.4323 0.8077
Trade 0.0636 0.0064 0.0485 0.0645 -0.1655 0.3429
HPI 0.0996 -0.0002 0.0142 0.0736 -0.0168 0.0736
Fract. of Owner-Occupied Housing 0.1953 -0.0518 0.0220 0.1850 0.3681 0.1566
HHI 0.0626 -0.0010 0.0021 0.0603 0.0095 0.0145
Banking Market Deposits 0.1268 0.0034 0.0019 0.1188 -0.0173 0.0101
Small Business Loans 0.0686 -0.0007 0.0016 0.0709 0.0066 0.0125
Establishment Size 0.0693 0.0030 0.0092 0.0915 -0.0728 0.0832
Industrial Diversity Index 0.0709 0.0026 0.0060 0.0713 -0.0349 0.0449
Union Membership 0.1297 0.0460 0.0258 0.1939 -0.5635 0.2526
Government Revenue 0.0711 -0.0016 0.0024 0.0738 0.0117 0.0170
Government Expenditures 0.0819 -0.0019 0.0029 0.0875 0.0207 0.0210
Notes: The table represents the Bayesian Model Averaging results for the regression in (8). The rst column
represents the covariate set considered, i.e., the set of potential x variables. The columns under \Maximum
Response" and \Total Cost of Business Cycle" depict the inclusion probabilities [P( 6= 0jir)], the posterior means
[calculated by (12)], and the posterior standard deviation [calculated as a square root of (13)] when the regressand
is a particular property of the impulse response based on every 100th draw of parameter distribution. The presented
results are the averages over these draws. HH, HHI, and HPI stand for Households, Herndahl-Hirschman Index,


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Figure 1: The Response of the Aggregate Economy to a Contractionary Monetary
Shock
Notes: The solid line indicates the modal impulse response, while the dotted lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles
of the impulse response function distributions.
39Figure 2: (Modal) Employment Response to a Contractionary Monetary Shock - All
Cities
(a) Period 4 (b) Period 8
(c) Period 16
40Figure 3: (Modal) Employment Response at the Trough - All Cities
(a) All Cities

























































42Figure 5: Employment Response to Monetary Shock - Representative Cities
(a) Baton Rouge, LA (b) Boise City, ID
(c) Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY (d) Albuquerque, NM
Notes: The solid line indicates the modal impulse response, while the dotted lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles
of the impulse response function distributions.
43